Chapter 10 Section 3 Guided Reading and Review Answer Key New Threats From Overseas
This introductory chapter summarizes the volume's argument. It explains that U.S.-China competition is over regional and global social club, outlines what Chinese-led club might wait like, explores why grand strategy matters and how to study it, and discusses competing views of whether China has a yard strategy. Information technology argues that China has sought to displace America from regional and global social club through 3 sequential "strategies of deportation" pursued at the military machine, political, and economic levels. The first of these strategies sought to blunt American social club regionally, the second sought to build Chinese gild regionally, and the third — a strategy of expansion — now seeks to do both globally. The introduction explains that shifts in China's strategy are profoundly shaped by key events that change its perception of American ability.
Introduction
It was 1872, and Li Hongzhang was writing at a time of historic upheaval. A Qing Dynasty general and official who dedicated much of his life to reforming a dying empire, Li was often compared to his contemporary Otto von Bismarck, the architect of German language unification and national power whose portrait Li was said to keep for inspiration.1
Like Bismarck, Li had military experience that he parlayed into considerable influence, including over strange and military policy. He had been instrumental in putting downwards the fourteen-year Taiping rebellion—the bloodiest conflict of the unabridged nineteenth century—which had seen a millenarian Christian state ascension from the growing vacuum of Qing authority to launch a ceremonious war that claimed tens of millions of lives. This entrada against the rebels provided Li with an appreciation for Western weapons and applied science, a fright of European and Japanese predations, a commitment to Chinese cocky-strengthening and modernization—and critically—the influence and prestige to do something nearly it.
In a memorandum advocating for more investment in Chinese shipbuilding, [Li Hongzhang] penned a line since repeated for generations: Communist china was experiencing "great changes non seen in 3 chiliad years."
Left: Li Hongzhang, also romanised as Li Hung-chang, in 1896. Source: Alice East. Neve Little, Li Hung-Chang: His Life and Times (London: Cassell & Company, 1903).
And so it was in 1872 that in 1 of his many correspondences, Li reflected on the groundbreaking geopolitical and technological transformations he had seen in his own life that posed an existential threat to the Qing. In a memorandum advocating for more than investment in Chinese shipbuilding, he penned a line since repeated for generations: China was experiencing "great changes not seen in three 1000 years."2
That famous, sweeping statement is to many Chinese nationalists a reminder of the country'due south own humiliation. Li ultimately failed to modernize People's republic of china, lost a state of war to Japan, and signed the embarrassing Treaty of Shimonoseki with Tokyo. But to many, Li'due south line was both prescient and accurate—China's decline was the product of the Qing Dynasty's inability to reckon with transformative geopolitical and technological forces that had not been seen for iii grand years, forces which inverse the international balance of power and ushered in Communist china's "Century of Humiliation." These were trends that all of Li's striving could non contrary.
If Li's line marks the highpoint of China'southward humiliation, so Eleven'south marks an occasion for its rejuvenation. If Li's evokes tragedy, then Eleven'due south evokes opportunity.
Right: Xi Jinping, president of the People's Republic of Mainland china since 2013. Source: Reuters
Now, Li's line has been repurposed past Communist china's leader Eleven Jinping to inaugurate a new phase in Prc'due south mail–Cold War grand strategy. Since 2017, Xi has in many of the country's critical foreign policy addresses declared that the globe is in the midst of "great changes unseen in a century" [百年未有之大变局]. If Li'southward line marks the highpoint of China's humiliation, and then Xi'south marks an occasion for its rejuvenation. If Li'due south evokes tragedy, then Xi'southward evokes opportunity. Simply both capture something essential: the idea that earth gild is once again at stake because of unprecedented geopolitical and technological shifts, and that this requires strategic aligning.
For Xi, the origin of these shifts is Mainland china'due south growing power and what it saw as the West'due south credible self-destruction. On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Then, a little more three months later, a populist surge catapulted Donald Trump into function as president of the Us. From People's republic of china'due south perspective—which is highly sensitive to changes in its perceptions of American power and threat—these two events were shocking. Beijing believed that the world's about powerful democracies were withdrawing from the international order they had helped erect away and were struggling to govern themselves at abode. The West's subsequent response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, and then the storming of the U.s. Capitol past extremists in 2021, reinforced a sense that "time and momentum are on our side," as Xi Jinping put it shortly later those events.iii China's leadership and foreign policy elite declared that a "period of historical opportunity" [历史机遇期] had emerged to expand the country'southward strategic focus from Asia to the wider globe and its governance systems.
We are now in the early years of what comes side by side—a China that non only seeks regional influence as so many corking powers exercise, but as Evan Osnos has argued, "that is preparing to shape the xx-offset century, much equally the U.South. shaped the twentieth."4 That competition for influence will be a global one, and Beijing believes with good reason that the next decade will likely determine the outcome.
What are Cathay's ambitions, and does it have a chiliad strategy to achieve them? If information technology does, what is that strategy, what shapes it, and what should the The states do about it?
As we enter this new stretch of acute competition, we lack answers to critical foundational questions. What are People's republic of china's ambitions, and does it have a k strategy to achieve them? If it does, what is that strategy, what shapes information technology, and what should the United States do nearly it? These are bones questions for American policymakers grappling with this century's greatest geopolitical challenge, not least because knowing an opponent'south strategy is the starting time step to countering information technology. And yet, equally groovy power tensions flare, there is no consensus on the answers.
This book attempts to provide an answer. In its statement and structure, the book takes its inspiration in function from Cold State of war studies of Us one thousand strategy.v Where those works analyzed the theory and practice of US "strategies of containment" toward the Soviet Matrimony during the Cold State of war, this book seeks to analyze the theory and practice of Communist china's "strategies of deportation" toward the U.s. subsequently the Cold War.
To do so, the book makes utilise of an original database of Chinese Communist Political party documents—memoirs, biographies, and daily records of senior officials—painstakingly gathered and so digitized over the last several years from libraries, bookstores in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and Chinese east-commerce sites (run across Appendix). Many of the documents have readers behind the closed doors of the Chinese Communist Party, bring them into its high-level strange policy institutions and meetings, and introduce readers to a wide cast of Chinese political leaders, generals, and diplomats charged with devising and implementing China'due south grand strategy. While no 1 principal document contains all of Chinese thousand strategy, its outline can be constitute across a wide corpus of texts. Within them, the Party uses hierarchical statements that stand for internal consensus on key problems to guide the send of state, and these statements can exist traced across time. The most important of these is the Party line (路线), then the guideline (方针), and finally the policy (政策), among other terms. Agreement them sometimes requires proficiency not only in Chinese, only also in seemingly impenetrable and archaic ideological concepts like "dialectical unities" and "historical materialism."
Argument in Brief
The volume argues that the core of U.s.-China competition since the Common cold War has been over regional and now global order. It focuses on the strategies that rising powers like Mainland china use to readapt an established hegemon like the United States brusque of state of war. A hegemon's position in regional and global order emerges from three wide "forms of control" that are used to regulate the behavior of other states: coercive adequacy (to force compliance), consensual inducements (to incentivize it), and legitimacy (to rightfully command it). For ascension states, the act of peacefully displacing the hegemon consists of two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence. The first strategy is to blunt the hegemon'due south exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; after all, no rise country tin can displace the hegemon if information technology remains at the hegemon's mercy. The 2d is to build forms of control over others; indeed, no rising state can become a hegemon if it cannot secure the deference of other states through coercive threats, consensual inducements, or rightful legitimacy. Unless a ascension power has first blunted the hegemon, efforts to build order are likely to exist futile and easily opposed. And until a rising power has successfully conducted a skilful caste of blunting and edifice in its home region, it remains too vulnerable to the hegemon's influence to confidently turn to a third strategy, global expansion, which pursues both blunting and building at the global level to displace the hegemon from international leadership. Together, these strategies at the regional and and so global levels provide a rough means of rise for the Chinese Communist Political party's nationalist elites, who seek to restore China to its due place and roll dorsum the historical aberration of the Westward'south overwhelming global influence.
This is a template Cathay has followed, and in its review of Cathay'southward strategies of deportation, the book argues that shifts from one strategy to the next have been triggered by sharp discontinuities in the most important variable shaping Chinese one thousand strategy: its perception of United states of america power and threat. China's first strategy of displacement (1989–2008) was to quietly blunt American power over Red china, particularly in Asia, and it emerged subsequently the traumatic trifecta of Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War, and the Soviet collapse led Beijing to sharply increase its perception of US threat. Red china's 2nd strategy of displacement (2008–2016) sought to build the foundation for regional hegemony in Asia, and it was launched afterwards the Global Financial Crisis led Beijing to see Us power as diminished and emboldened it to take a more confident approach. Now, with the invocation of "bully changes unseen in a century" following Brexit, President Trump's election, and the coronavirus pandemic, China is launching a third strategy of displacement, one that expands its blunting and edifice efforts worldwide to displace the United states as the global leader. In its last chapters, this book uses insights about Red china'southward strategy to formulate an disproportionate US grand strategy in response—one that takes a page from People's republic of china'south own book—and would seek to contest China'south regional and global ambitions without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-transport, or loan-for-loan.
Order away is often a reflection of order at habitation, and China's lodge-edifice would be distinctly illiberal relative to United states order-edifice.
The book also illustrates what Chinese society might look like if China is able to attain its goal of "national rejuvenation" past the centennial of the founding of the People'due south Republic of Communist china in 2049. At the regional level, China already accounts for more than half of Asian GDP and half of all Asian military spending, which is pushing the region out of balance and toward a Chinese sphere of influence. A fully realized Chinese order might somewhen involve the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and Korea, the end of American regional alliances, the effective removal of the US Navy from the Western Pacific, deference from Red china's regional neighbors, unification with Taiwan, and the resolution of territorial disputes in the Eastward and Southward Prc Seas. Chinese order would likely be more coercive than the present order, consensual in ways that primarily do good continued elites even at the expense of voting publics, and considered legitimate generally to those few who it directly rewards. Cathay would deploy this order in means that damage liberal values, with disciplinarian winds blowing stronger across the region. Order abroad is ofttimes a reflection of club at domicile, and China's order-edifice would exist distinctly illiberal relative to United states order-building.
At the global level, Chinese society would involve seizing the opportunities of the "great changes unseen in a century" and displacing the Us every bit the earth'southward leading state. This would crave successfully managing the master risk flowing from the "cracking changes"—Washington's unwillingness to gracefully accept decline—by weakening the forms of control supporting American global social club while strengthening those forms of control supporting a Chinese alternative. That order would span a "zone of super-ordinate influence" in Asia every bit well equally "partial hegemony" in swaths of the developing world that might gradually expand to encompass the world's industrialized centers—a vision some Chinese pop writers describe using Mao'south revolutionary guidance to "surround the cities from the countryside" [农村包围城市].6 More authoritative sources put this arroyo in less sweeping terms, suggesting Chinese lodge would be anchored in China'due south Belt and Route Initiative and its Community of Mutual Destiny, with the former in particular creating networks of coercive capability, consensual inducement, and legitimacy.7
The "struggle for mastery," one time bars to Asia, is now over the global guild and its future. If there are two paths to hegemony—a regional one and a global ane—China is at present pursuing both.
Some of the strategy to achieve this global society is already discernable in Xi's speeches. Politically, Beijing would project leadership over global governance and international institutions, split Western alliances, and advance autocratic norms at the expense of liberal ones. Economically, it would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite US hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the "fourth industrial revolution" from artificial intelligence to quantum calculating, with the United States declining into a "deindustrialized, English-speaking version of a Latin American commonwealth, specializing in commodities, existent estate, tourism, and maybe transnational tax evasion."8 Militarily, the People's Liberation Ground forces (PLA) would field a globe-class strength with bases around the globe that could defend Communist china'due south interests in most regions and even in new domains like space, the poles, and the deep sea. The fact that aspects of this vision are visible in high-level speeches is strong evidence that Cathay'due south ambitions are not limited to Taiwan or to dominating the Indo-Pacific. The "struggle for mastery," in one case bars to Asia, is now over the global order and its future. If there are two paths to hegemony—a regional one and a global i—China is now pursuing both.
This glimpse at possible Chinese order mayhap striking, merely it should not be surprising. Over a decade ago, Lee Kuan Yew—the visionary politician who built modern Singapore and personally knew China'south top leaders—was asked by an interviewer, "Are Chinese leaders serious nigh displacing the United states as the number one power in Asia and in the earth?" He answered with an emphatic yes. "Of grade. Why not?" he began, "They have transformed a poor society by an economic miracle to go at present the second-largest economy in the world—on track . . . to become the world'southward largest economic system." China, he continued, boasts "a culture iv,000 years old with 1.iii billion people, with a huge and very talented pool to draw from. How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia, and in time the world?" China was "growing at rates unimaginable 50 years ago, a dramatic transformation no i predicted," he observed, and "every Chinese wants a strong and rich Prc, a nation as prosperous, advanced, and technologically competent as America, Europe, and Japan." He closed his answer with a key insight: "This reawakened sense of destiny is an overpowering forcefulness. . . . China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the Westward." China might want to "share this century" with the United states, perchance as "co-equals," he noted, but certainly not as subordinates.nine
Why Grand Strategy Matters
The need for a grounded understanding of China's intentions and strategy has never been more urgent. China at present poses a challenge unlike any the Us has ever faced. For more than a century, no US antagonist or coalition of adversaries has reached 60 percent of Us GDP. Neither Wilhelmine Germany during the First World War, the combined might of Imperial Japan and Nazi Deutschland during the Second Earth State of war, nor the Soviet Spousal relationship at the meridian of its economic ability ever crossed this threshold.ten And yet, this is a milestone that Mainland china itself quietly reached as early as 2014. When one adjusts for the relative price of goods, People's republic of china's economy is already 25 percent larger than the Us economy.eleven It is articulate, then, that Communist china is the most significant competitor that the United States has faced and that the way Washington handles its emergence to superpower status volition shape the class of the side by side century.
What makes grand strategy "grand" is not simply the size of the strategic objectives but also the fact that disparate "ways" are coordinated together to achieve it.
What is less clear, at least in Washington, is whether China has a grand strategy and what information technology might be. This book defines grand strategy as a state's theory of how it can achieve its strategic objectives that is intentional, coordinated, and implemented across multiple means of statecraft—war machine, economic, and political. What makes grand strategy "chiliad" is not but the size of the strategic objectives just also the fact that disparate "means" are coordinated together to reach it. That kind of coordination is rare, and most great powers consequently do not have a 1000 strategy.
When states do have chiliad strategies, however, they tin can reshape globe history. Nazi Germany wielded a one thousand strategy that used economic tools to constrain its neighbors, armed services buildups to intimidate its rivals, and political alignments to encircle its adversaries—allowing it to outperform its keen power competitors for a considerable time even though its Gross domestic product was less than one-third theirs. During the Cold War, Washington pursued a grand strategy that at times used armed forces power to deter Soviet aggression, economical aid to curtail communist influence, and political institutions to bind liberal states together—limiting Soviet influence without a United states-Soviet state of war. How China similarly integrates its instruments of statecraft in pursuit of overarching regional and global objectives remains an expanse that has received abundant speculation but piddling rigorous written report despite its enormous consequences. The coordination and long-term planning involved in one thousand strategy allow a state to dial above its weight; since China is already a heavyweight, if information technology has a coherent scheme that coordinates its $14 trillion economy with its blue-water navy and rising political influence around the world—and the United states either misses it or misunderstands it—the course of the twenty-first century may unfold in ways detrimental to the Us and the liberal values it has long championed.
Washington is late coming to terms with this reality, and the outcome is the most consequential reassessment of its China policy in over a generation. And still, amid this reassessment, there is wide-ranging disagreement over what China wants and where it is going. Some believe Beijing has global ambitions; others debate that its focus is largely regional. Some claim information technology has a coordinated 100-year programme; others that information technology is opportunistic and error-prone. Some label Beijing a boldly revisionist ability; others see information technology as a sober-minded stakeholder of the electric current club. Some say Beijing wants the United States out of Asia; and others that it tolerates a small Usa function. Where analysts increasingly agree is on the idea that China's recent assertiveness is a product of Chinese President Xi'southward personality—a mistaken notion that ignores the long-standing Party consensus in which People's republic of china's behavior is actually rooted. The fact that the contemporary debate remains divided on and so many fundamental questions related to China'due south grand strategy—and inaccurate even in its major areas of understanding—is troubling, especially since each question holds wildly different policy implications.
The Unsettled Debate
This volume enters a largely unresolved fence over Chinese strategy divided between "skeptics" and "believers." The skeptics accept not all the same been persuaded that China has a grand strategy to readapt the United States regionally or globally; by dissimilarity, the believers accept not truly attempted persuasion.
The skeptics are a wide-ranging and securely knowledgeable group. "China has all the same to formulate a true 'thousand strategy,'" notes 1 member, "and the question is whether information technology wants to do so at all."12 Others have argued that Red china'south goals are "inchoate" and that Beijing lacks a "well-divers" strategy.13 Chinese authors similar Professor Wang Jisi, former dean of Peking University's Schoolhouse of International Relations, are besides in the skeptical army camp. "In that location is no strategy that we could come upwardly with past racking our brains that would be able to comprehend all the aspects of our national interests," he notes.14
Other skeptics believe that China's aims are limited, arguing that China does not wish to displace the United states regionally or globally and remains focused primarily on development and domestic stability. One deeply experienced White Firm official was not yet convinced of "Xi'southward desire to throw the United states out of Asia and destroy U.S. regional alliances."fifteen Other prominent scholars put the point more forcefully: "[One] hugely distorted notion is the now all-too-common assumption that People's republic of china seeks to eject the United States from Asia and subjugate the region. In fact, no conclusive testify exists of such Chinese goals."xvi
In contrast to these skeptics are the believers. This group is persuaded that China has a grand strategy to displace the United States regionally and globally, but it has not put forwards a work to persuade the skeptics. Inside government, some peak intelligence officials—including quondam manager of national intelligence Dan Coates—have stated publicly that "the Chinese fundamentally seek to replace the Us as the leading power in the world" but have not (or perhaps could not) elaborate farther, nor did they suggest that this goal was accompanied by a specific strategy.17
Outside of authorities, just a few recent works attempt to brand the instance at length. The most famous is Pentagon official Michael Pillsbury'south bestselling 1 Hundred Year Marathon, though it argues somewhat overstatedly that China has had a secret yard plan for global hegemony since 1949 and, in key places, relies heavily on personal authority and anecdote.18 Many other books come to similar conclusions and get much correct, but they are more intuitive than rigorously empirical and could have been more than persuasive with a social scientific approach and a richer evidentiary base.19 A handful of works on Chinese thou strategy take a broader perspective emphasizing the distant past or futurity, only they therefore dedicate less time to the disquisitional stretch from the post–Cold War era to the nowadays that is the locus of U.s.a.-China competition.20 Finally, some works mix a more than empirical approach with careful and precise arguments about China'due south contemporary grand strategy. These works form the foundation for this book's approach.21
This book, which draws on the research of so many others, also hopes to stand apart in key means. These include a unique social-scientific approach to defining and studying grand strategy; a large trove of rarely cited or previously inaccessible Chinese texts; a systematic study of fundamental puzzles in Chinese armed forces, political, and economical behavior; and a close wait at the variables shaping strategic adjustment. Taken together, it is hoped that the book makes a contribution to the emerging Red china contend with a unique method for systematically and rigorously uncovering Cathay's m strategy.
Uncovering 1000 Strategy
The challenge of deciphering a rival's grand strategy from its disparate behavior is not a new one. In the years before the Beginning World State of war, the British diplomat Eyre Crowe wrote an important twenty,000-discussion "Memorandum on the Nowadays State of British Relations with France and Germany" that attempted to explain the wide-ranging behavior of a ascent Germany.22 Crowe was a keen observer of Anglo-German relations with a passion and perspective for the field of study informed by his ain heritage. Born in Leipzig and educated in Berlin and Düsseldorf, Crowe was half High german, spoke German-absolute English, and joined the British Foreign Part at the age of 20-one. During Globe State of war I, his British and High german families were literally at war with one another—his British nephew perished at sea while his German cousin rose to become main of the German Naval Staff.
Crowe argued in his framing of the enterprise, "the pick must prevarication betwixt . . . 2 hypotheses"—each of which resemble the positions of today's skeptics and believers with respect to China's grand strategy.
Left: British diplomat Eyre Crowe (1864-1925). Engagement unknown. Author unknown. Source: Wikimedia Eatables
Crowe, who wrote his memorandum in 1907, sought to systematically analyze the disparate, complex, and seemingly uncoordinated range of German foreign behavior, to decide whether Berlin had a "thousand design" that ran through it, and to report to his superiors what it might be. In gild to "codify and take a theory that will fit all the ascertained facts of German foreign policy," Crowe argued in his framing of the enterprise, "the choice must lie between . . . two hypotheses"—each of which resemble the positions of today's skeptics and believers with respect to China's grand strategy.23
Crowe's showtime hypothesis was that Federal republic of germany had no grand strategy, just what he called a "vague, dislocated, and unpractical statesmanship." In this view, Crowe wrote, it is possible that "Federal republic of germany does not really know what she is driving at, and that all her excursions and alarums, all her underhand intrigues exercise non contribute to the steady working out of a well conceived and relentlessly followed system of policy."24 Today, this statement mirrors those of skeptics who claim China'south bureaucratic politics, factional infighting, economic priorities, and nationalist knee-wiggle reactions all conspire to thwart Beijing from formulating or executing an overarching strategy.24
Crowe'due south second hypothesis was that important elements of German behavior were coordinated together through a grand strategy "consciously aiming at the establishment of a German hegemony, at first in Europe, and somewhen in the world."26 Crowe ultimately endorsed a more cautious version of this hypothesis, and he concluded that German strategy was "deeply rooted in the relative position of the two countries," with Berlin dissatisfied by the prospect of remaining subordinate to London in perpetuity.26 This statement mirrors the position of believers in Chinese 1000 strategy. It also resembles the argument of this volume: Cathay has pursued a variety of strategies to displace the United States at the regional and global level which are fundamentally driven past its relative position with Washington.
The fact that the questions the Crowe memorandum explored have a striking similarity to those we are grappling with today has not been lost on US officials. Henry Kissinger quotes from it in On China. Max Baucus, former US administrator to China, frequently mentioned the memo to his Chinese interlocutors as a roundabout style of inquiring virtually Chinese strategy.28
Crowe'southward memorandum has a mixed legacy, with contemporary assessments split over whether he was right almost Germany. Nevertheless, the task Crowe set remains critical and no less difficult today, peculiarly because China is a "difficult target" for data collection. One might hope to amend on Crowe'south method with a more rigorous and falsifiable arroyo anchored in social scientific discipline. As the next chapter discusses in item, this book argues that to identify the existence, content, and aligning of China's thousand strategy, researchers must find evidence of (1) grand strategic concepts in authoritative texts; (two) chiliad strategic capabilities in national security institutions; and (3) grand strategic deport in state beliefs. Without such an approach, whatsoever assay is more likely to autumn victim to the kinds of natural biases in "perception and misperception" that frequently recur in assessments of other powers.29
Chapter Summaries
This book argues that, since the stop of the Cold War, Red china has pursued a grand strategy to displace American order offset at the regional and now at the global level.
Chapter 1 defines k strategy and international guild, and then explores how ascent powers displace hegemonic order through strategies of blunting, building, and expansion. It explains how perceptions of the established hegemon'south power and threat shape the choice of rising power yard strategies.
Affiliate two focuses on the Chinese Communist Party every bit the connective institutional tissue for China's grand strategy. As a nationalist institution that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the belatedly Qing menses, the Political party now seeks to restore China to its rightful identify in the global hierarchy by 2049. As a Leninist establishment with a centralized construction, ruthless amorality, and a Leninist vanguard seeing itself as stewarding a nationalist project, the Political party possesses the "thou strategic capability" to coordinate multiple instruments of statecraft while pursuing national interests over parochial ones. Together, the Party'south nationalist orientation helps set the ends of Chinese grand strategy while Leninism provides an instrument for realizing them. Now, as China rises, the same Party that saturday uneasily within Soviet order during the Cold State of war is unlikely to permanently tolerate a subordinate role in American order. Finally, the affiliate focuses on the Party as a subject of research, noting how a careful review of the Party's voluminous publications can provide insight into its grand strategic concepts.
Office I begins with Chapter 3, which explores the blunting stage of China's post–Cold War yard strategy using Chinese Communist Party texts. It demonstrates that China went from seeing the United States as a quasi-ally against the Soviets to seeing information technology as Mainland china's greatest threat and "chief adversary" in the wake of three events: the traumatic trifecta of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Gulf War, and the Soviet Plummet. In response, Beijing launched its blunting strategy nether the Party guideline of "hiding capabilities and biding time." This strategy was instrumental and tactical. Party leaders explicitly tied the guideline to perceptions of US power captured in phrases like the "international rest of forces" and "multipolarity," and they sought to quietly and asymmetrically weaken American power in Asia beyond military, economical, and political instruments, each of which is considered in the subsequent three book chapters.
Chapter 4 considers blunting at the military level. It shows that the trifecta prompted China to depart from a "sea control" strategy increasingly focused on holding afar maritime territory to a "ocean denial" strategy focused on preventing the United states of america military from traversing, decision-making, or intervening in the waters about Red china. That shift was challenging, and so Beijing declared it would "catch up in some areas and non others" and vowed to build "whatever the enemy fears" to accomplish it—ultimately delaying the conquering of costly and vulnerable vessels similar aircraft carriers and instead investing in cheaper asymmetric denial weapons. Beijing then congenital the globe's largest mine armory, the earth'southward get-go anti-transport ballistic missile, and the world'south largest submarine armada—all to undermine United states military ability.
Chapter v considers blunting at the political level. Information technology demonstrates that the trifecta led China to contrary its previous opposition to joining regional institutions. Beijing feared that multilateral organizations similar Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Clan of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) might be used by Washington to build a liberal regional order or even an Asian NATO, so China joined them to blunt American power. It stalled institutional progress, wielded institutional rules to constrain US liberty of maneuver, and hoped participation would reassure wary neighbors otherwise tempted to bring together a U.s.a.-led balancing coalition.
Chapter 6 considers blunting at the economical level. It argues that the trifecta laid blank China's dependence on the US market, upper-case letter, and engineering—notably through Washington'due south post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke about-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which could accept seriously damaged China'due south economy. Beijing sought non to decouple from the United states but instead to bind the discretionary utilise of American economical power, and it worked hard to remove MFN from congressional review through "permanent normal trading relations," leveraging negotiations in APEC and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to obtain it.
Considering Political party leaders explicitly tied blunting to assessments of American ability, that meant that when those perceptions changed, so also did People's republic of china's thousand strategy. Part II of the book explores this 2nd stage in Chinese grand strategy, which was focused on building regional club. The strategy took place under a modification to Deng'south guidance to "hide capabilities and bide time," one that instead emphasized "actively accomplishing something."
Chapter 7 explores this building strategy in Political party texts, demonstrating that the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States equally weakening and emboldened information technology to shift to a building strategy. It begins with a thorough review of Prc's discourse on "multipolarity" and the "international rest of forces." It then shows that the Political party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance "actively accomplish something" [积极有所作为] issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economical—each of which receives a affiliate.
Chapter eight focuses on building at the military machine level, recounting how the Global Fiscal Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a atypical focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through body of water control. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security appurtenances. For these objectives, China needed a different force structure, one that information technology had previously postponed for fear that it would be vulnerable to the Usa and unsettle China's neighbors. These were risks a more confident Beijing was now willing to take. China promptly stepped up investments in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels, amphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases.
Chapter nine focuses on building at the political level. It shows how the Global Financial Crisis caused People's republic of china to depart from a blunting strategy focused on joining and stalling regional organizations to a building strategy that involved launching its own institutions. China spearheaded the launch of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Banking company (AIIB) and the elevation and institutionalization of the previously obscure Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Edifice Measures in Asia (CICA). It then used these institutions, with mixed success, every bit instruments to shape regional order in the economic and security domains in directions it preferred.
Affiliate 10 focuses on edifice at the economic level. It argues that the Global Financial Crunch helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China's own coercive and consensual economical capacities. At the core of this effort were China's Belt and Route Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to proceeds greater fiscal influence.
Beijing used these blunting and edifice strategies to constrain US influence within Asia and to build the foundations for regional hegemony. The relative success of that strategy was remarkable, just Beijing's ambitions were non limited but to the Indo-Pacific. When Washington was again seen as stumbling, China's grand strategy evolved—this time in a more than global direction. Appropriately, Part III of this book focuses on China'due south third m strategy of displacement, global expansion, which sought to blunt but especially build global gild and to displace the United states from its leadership position.
Chapter 11 discusses the dawn of China'south expansion strategy. It argues that the strategy emerged following another trifecta, this fourth dimension consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West's poor initial response to the coronavirus pandemic. In this period, the Chinese Communist Party reached a paradoxical consensus: information technology concluded that the U.s. was in retreat globally merely at the same time was waking up to the Communist china claiming bilaterally. In Beijing's mind, "great changes unseen in a century" were underway, and they provided an opportunity to displace the Usa equally the leading global state past 2049, with the adjacent decade accounted the most critical to this objective.
Chapter 12 discusses the "ways and means" of China's strategy of expansion. It shows that politically, Beijing would seek to project leadership over global governance and international institutions and to advance autocratic norms. Economically, it would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite US hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the "quaternary industrial revolution." And militarily, the PLA would field a truly global Chinese military with overseas bases around the globe.
Chapter xiii, the volume'southward terminal affiliate, outlines a U.s.a. response to People's republic of china's ambitions for displacing the United States from regional and global order. It critiques those who abet a counterproductive strategy of confrontation or an accommodationist one of one thousand bargains, each of which respectively discounts US domestic headwinds and China'southward strategic ambitions. The chapter instead argues for an asymmetric competitive strategy, one that does not require matching China dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-transport, or loan-for-loan.
This toll-effective approach emphasizes denying Red china hegemony in its dwelling house region and—taking a page from elements of Mainland china's ain blunting strategy—focuses on undermining Chinese efforts in Asia and worldwide in means that are of lower cost than Beijing's efforts to build hegemony. At the aforementioned time, this affiliate argues that the Usa should pursue guild-building equally well, reinvesting in the very aforementioned foundations of American global order that Beijing presently seeks to weaken. This discussion seeks to convince policymakers that even every bit the The states faces challenges at abode and away, information technology can nevertheless secure its interests and resist the spread of an illiberal sphere of influence—but only if it recognizes that the central to defeating an opponent's strategy is commencement to understand it.
Nearly the Writer
Acknowledgments
Web design: Rachel Slattery
Blitz Doshi is currently serving as director for People's republic of china on the Biden administration'south National Security Council (NSC), but the book this excerpt was drawn from was completed before his regime service, is based entirely on open sources, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.Southward. government or NSC.
Source: https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/
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